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focus on the trends across time, variety between member sta-
tes, party groups, and ideological party families.
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I N T RODU C T ION
This paper examines party group switching in the European Parliament (ep). 
A core set of political groups have operated in the ep since the first direct 
elections in 1979, namely the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, the Liber-
als, and the Communists. But in the course of ep legislatures, there have been 
frequent movements of individuals and national party delegations in and out 
of these groups. Moreover, the composition of these groups has varied sig-
nificantly between legislative mandates. Furthermore, a significant number 
of new parliamentary groups have emerged, merged, and disappeared during 
and between ep legislatures. The fluidity of the ep party system contrasts with 
the stability of parliamentary parties during the course of legislative mandates 
in most West European democracies.
The existing literature on party groups and political coalitions in the ep 
is dominated by analyses on voting cohesion, drawing on roll call votes to 
examine the compliance of national party delegations with the voting line of 
1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the joint meeting of the Maastricht 
 University research group on Politics and Culture of Europe and the ics-ul research program 
Citizenship and Democratic Institutions (Lisbon, June 2010), the meeting of the ecpr Standing 
Group on European Union (Porto, June 2010), and the biennial conference of the European 
Union Studies Association (Boston, March 2011). We thank Thomas Christiansen, Peter A. 
Hall, Bjorn Hoyland, and Steven Van Hecke for their comments. We are grateful for research 
assistance by Vera Henriques and Ana Guardião. Part of the research has been funded by the 
fct project “Switching Behavior in the European Parliament: Voting Power and Ideology”, 
ref. pocti / cpo / 61012 / 2004.
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Political Groups in the ep (see Attina, 1990; Bardi, 1994; Faas, 2002, 2003; Hix, 
2002, 2005; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006, 2007; Kreppel, 2002, 2004; Marsh 
and Norris, 1997). There have been few analyses of political affiliation in the 
ep specifically geared toward an understanding of the phenomenon of party 
group switching (for exceptions, on specific cases and periods, see Verzichelli, 
1999; Maurer, Parkes, and Wagner, 2008; Evans, 2009; McElroy, 2008; McElroy 
and Benoit, 2007, 2009).
This paper seeks to contribute to a better understanding of this phenom-
enon. We trace all instances when members of the ep (meps) have changed 
between ep groups (epgs) in the period between the first directly elected 
 legislature in 1979 and the end of the sixth legislature in 2009. In order to do 
so, and drawing on earlier databases containing comprehensive information 
on the parliamentary activities of meps (Hix et al., 2006; Hoyland et al., 2009), 
as well as on data from the ep archives, we have built a new comprehensive 
dataset with extensive information on the ep curriculum of the 4163 person 
legislature combinations between 1979 and 2009. The results of a first descrip-
tive analysis of these data highlight the significant extent of group switching 
in the ep, with on average 9% of all meps, and up to 18% of meps during the 
1989-1994 legislature switching party group, with some of them switching up 
to four times per legislature. These findings constitute a building block toward 
a more systematic understanding of party system fluidity in the European Par-
liament and of the more general phenomenon of legislative switching.
Before proceeding to the presentation of our dataset and core findings, we 
give a brief account of the role and functions of European Party Groups (epgs) 
and their importance in ep parliamentary life. In particular, we address the 
specificities that characterize these party groups, when compared to the typical 
parliamentary groups of West European parliamentary settings. The goal is to 
provide a summarized account of the institutional context in which choices of 
ep political affiliation are made and how such decisions relate to the primary 
goals of elected politicians in the ep. We relate this discussion to available lit-
erature on the topic of legislative switching. Next we address the methodol-
ogy adopted for the compilation of the data, in particular coding procedures 
and the cross-checking techniques we have adopted in order to guarantee the 
reliability of the information. We also provide an account of the core features 
of the dataset. In the section on the evolution of switching in the European 
Parliament between 1979 and 2009 we focus on the variation across legisla-
tures, countries, and political families, the timing of switches, directions of the 
flows, the percentage of collective vs. individual switching, and the relation-
ship between switching at the national and supranational levels. We conclude 
with a brief discussion of these findings.
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T H E C HA R AC T E R A N D E VOLU T ION
OF PA R L IA M E N TA RY G ROU P S I N T H E E P
European Political Groups (epgs) differ from national parliamentary parties, 
and some fluidity of membership should be expected as a result: epgs are not 
the “parliamentary arms” of enduring and effectively competing party orga-
nizations. Although one can argue that the oldest groups in the ep have built 
up some organizational strength and mechanisms for continuity through 
their links with European party federations (see Maurer, Parkes and Wagner, 
2008), in general epgs can be described as post-electoral coalitions between 
national party delegations and individuals who broadly identify with a set 
of programmatic principles. Each parliamentary group in the ep is made of 
a set of party delegations and meps who come from different cultural set-
tings, with entrenched national perceptions and specific historical legacies, 
and which represent more diverse social, economic, and political interests 
and organizational traditions than any national parliamentary party. epgs 
do not perform the typical gate keeping function of national political par-
ties because it is the latter that have a determinant voice in the selection of 
candidates for the ep elections. Furthermore, there is no direct link between 
European political groups and voters. Although the largest and oldest epgs 
issue policy platforms and election manifestos before ep elections, the cam-
paigns for these elections are run by national parties and often revolve around 
national issues (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Kreppel, 2002, 2004; McElroy and 
Benoit, 2009). This leaves a wide scope of choice for ep grouping by elected 
representatives. National parties that compete for votes at the domestic level 
may choose to belong to one same parliamentary group in the ep. A case in 
pointare the Portuguese Left Bloc and the Portuguese Communist Party, two 
parties that contest on the left in Portugal but sit together in the Confederal 
Group of the European United Left / Nordic Green Left (gue / ngl) in the 
European  Parliament.
Nevertheless, the choice of political groups in the ep is critical. epgs play 
a key role in important aspects of organizational and political life in the ep. 
They play a key role in agenda setting and question time (see Rule 115) and in 
appointing meps to leadership positions in the ep and to important functions 
in committees and delegations (Rules 13, 24 and 186). Each epg is entitled to 
a share of the ep budget, which is calculated according to a complex formula 
that takes into account the number of members and the number of languages 
represented in the group (Rule 31). The Groups are also entitled to support 
from the ep in terms of staff, office space, and technical facilities (see  Corbett 
et al., 2005, p. 95 and ff). All these perks are important for national party 
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 delegations, including the financial appropriations from which they share to 
help finance staff and to conduct “information” activities (ibid, p. 102). Fur-
thermore, group membership is of great significance for the capability to bar-
gain the outcomes of voting in the ep (see Settembri, 2004). This means that, 
as the ep has acquired more powers through treaty revisions, the role of its 
political groups in influencing policy has also increased. Hence, the first and 
most important choice national party leaders and meps make when elected to 
the ep is whether to form a new group, or join an existing group, or to become 
non-attached, or to maintain membership in their previous group – in the case 
of those who held seats in the previous ep legislature (see Maurer, Parkes, and 
Wagner, 2008, p. 250).
The two largest groups – the Socialists and the Christian Democrats – have 
dominated party politics in the ep, and have held a large percentage of leader-
ship functions in the ep. During the first five ep legislatures, between 1979 and 
1999, the weight of these two groups increased steadily, from 53.6% of seats to 
66% of seats. The combined weight of the two groups declined somewhat to 
62.6% of the seats at the beginning of the sixth legislature, in July 2004. At dif-
ferent stages of the institutional development of the ep, there have been impor-
tant changes of its party group composition, and a tendency for fragmentation, 
with the emergence of new political groups on the left and right – but more 
accentuated on the right – and with the formation of groups voicing regional 
interests, green movements, and eurosceptic parties as well. Until 1972, only 
three political families, namely the Socialists, the Liberals, and the Christian 
Democrats, were represented in the ep. With the 1979 direct elections, the 
ideological spectrum of the ep widened out of the center, toward both left and 
right, with the Communist and Allies group monopolizing the left and the 
European Democratic Group and the European Progressive Democrats, split-
ting the right-hand side of the ep ideological spectrum.
The most significant additions to existing ep groups at the start of the sec-
ond legislature in 1984were the formation of the Rainbow group, representing 
regionalist and green parties, and of the new European Right group. The begin-
ning of the third legislature, in 1989, was marked by further fragmentation, 
following the split of the Communist Group into the Group for the European 
United Left and the Left Unity group, and the formation of the Green group, 
which stole seats from the Rainbow group and eventually led to the demise of 
the latter after the subsequent ep elections, in 1994.The fourth legislature was 
marked by further fragmentation as a consequence of the formation of a new 
regionalist party – the Group of the European Radical Alliance – and of the 
formation of the Europe of the Nations group, formally representing Euro-
sceptic / anti-eu parties in the ep, for the first time. Although the Group of the 
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European Right disappeared, a new group formed on the right, with the entry 
of the Forza Italia party delegation, which formed the Forza Europa group on 
its own (in 1995 the party transitioned to the Union for Europe group). In 
1999, the number of groups in the ep decreased again, with the merger of the 
national party delegations representing green and regionalist parties into one 
group. The opening of the sixth legislature in 2004 saw no significant change 
to the ideological distribution of epgs.
T H E I N ST I T U T IONA L F OU N DAT ION S
OF PA RT Y G ROU P S W I TC H I NG I N T H E E P
Several features of parliamentary life in the ep make it more complex and more 
subject to fragmentation than is the case in the standard institutional settings 
of West European parliaments. The entry in the ep of new national party del-
egations, bringing in new political views and new national interests when new 
Member States join the eu, induces political and institutional complexity and 
even invites unstable political behavior. Changes of procedural rules associ-
ated with alterations in the decision-making powers of the ep also contribute 
to complexity. Moreover, switching is facilitated by the lack of penalties in the 
Rules of Procedure (see Rule 17 and 186) and by the loose nature of parliamen-
tary groups in this institution. The indifference and low levels of knowledge 
among European voters with regard to ep activities and surveys on ep elec-
tions (see European Election Studies) reflected in the high levels of abstention 
for these electoral contests, also encourage a flexible approach to membership 
and open the door to the possibility of national party delegations and meps 
choosing to affiliate with different epgs. While these political and institutional 
elements facilitate switching behavior, they are insufficient to explain how this 
phenomenon is triggered, the evolutionary patterns that characterize it, and 
how it relates to party system development in the eu.
Research on legislative switching in national settings relates the institu-
tional context in which choices of political affiliation are made with the gen-
eral assumption established by earlier studies on party politics that political 
competition is driven by the basic goals of maximizing votes, office, and policy 
(Strom and Muller, 1999). The basic premise that inspires this approach is that 
institutions condition the resources and opportunities through which politi-
cians fulfill their ambitions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Political institutions that 
grant politicians a great deal of autonomy vis-à-vis parties, namely electoral 
rules that weaken party leadership control over candidate selection, weak 
party structures, weak ties between electorates, and party labels (i. e. weak 
party identification), allow politicians to manipulate political id for short-term 
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electoral goals and for the distribution of pork-barrel benefits among local 
clienteles (see Mainwaring, 1991 and Mainwaring and Scully, 1995). In these 
institutional settings, one should expect legislators to calculate their expected 
eligibility and distributional revenues in any party that may be generally com-
patible with their policy goals and to decide on switching party id if the elec-
toral benefits are greater than the transaction cost of moving (see Desposato, 
2006). The logical deduction is that one should expect legislators to remain in, 
or have incentives to move to, governing parties or large parties – because the 
latter give privileged access to state resources, and thus more pork, than oppo-
sition or smaller parties (see Heller and Mershon2005; 2009). In turn, parties 
should be willing to accept defectors when their current members reason that 
the arrival of new members increases their own expected payoff (see Laver and 
Benoit, 2003).
These studies shed light on the factors one would expect to influence the 
propensity to change political affiliation in the ep. As we have seen above, 
epgs do not control candidate selection, they lack party structures compa-
rable to those of national parties, and voters can hardly identify an epg label. 
Electoral rules matter very little in this context. All Member States – except for 
the uk until 1999– have adopted proportional methods for the ep elections. 
Although there are differences in proportionality related to the number and 
size of constituencies and to the thresholds for representation, as well as to 
the possibility that voters choose and / or rank their favorite candidates, such 
variation is insufficient to establish direct ties between the legislative behavior 
in the ep and re-election or re-nomination for party lists (see Corbett et al., 
2005, p. 14). In this loose ideological context, Evans (2009) and Maurer et al. 
(2008) claim that party leaders that do not represent extremist views and / or 
single issues have strong incentives to opt for one of the largest epgs. Based 
on examination of the ep affiliation of Portuguese parties since 1986, Evans 
argues that parties that rotate in national government tend to prefer (and try 
to move to) the epp and the pes, in order to enjoy the inter-institutional policy 
networks that are sponsored by these groups and that provide bargaining and 
informational capability that are unmatched by smaller groups, including the 
Liberals. After long stints in the opposition, party leaders may switch their dis-
course and ep membership toward Euro-scepticism, with the goal of enhanc-
ing their electoral prospects, as the cases of the British Conservatives and the 
Portuguese Popular Party illustrate. But as soon as these parties are elected 
back to government they start again to approach the largest ep groups (see 
Evans, 2009; Maurer et al., 2008).
Research on legislative party switching in national settings provides insights 
on other factors that have not been explored in the few studies  conducted so 
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far on ep switching. According to Shabad and Slomczynski (2004), one should 
expect to find a correlation between the direction of flows and the degree of 
party system development. Accordingly, party mergers and intense move-
ments to older (vs. new) parties are an indicator of party system consolidation. 
Flows within (rather than across) political families indicate the  consolidation 
of ideological blocs, which is accordingly, a general trait of developed party 
systems. We thus expect the direction of flows to point toward the  largest and 
oldest groups, namely the epp and the pes, because these are the epgs most 
endowed in terms of office and financial perks, and the more seats these groups 
obtain, the more resources they are entitled to.
Earlier studies have also found that different stages of the electoral cycle 
provide different kinds of incentives for switching, including the expectation 
to obtain parliamentary offices and privileges in the early period of legisla-
tures, the goal to improve electoral positioning in the late stages of a legisla-
tive mandate, and the aim to achieve policy goals at the time of major policy 
decisions (see Mershon and Shvetsova, 2005). Drawing on these findings, we 
expect switching in the ep to be concentrated in three periods of the legislative 
cycle: at the very beginning of each legislature, when national party delega-
tions negotiate the prerogatives of parliamentary group membership; before 
the legislative mid-term, when important leadership positions in the ep rotate 
(see Rule 17); and toward the end of the mandate, when meps position them-
selves for re-nomination to national party lists.
E P G ROU P S W I TC H I NG DATASET
Although much information is available on parliamentary affiliation and par-
liamentary behavior of meps (see in particular Hix et al., 2006 and  Hoyland 
et al., 2009), none of the existing databases is specifically geared toward the 
analysis of group switching in the ep. As a result, and somewhat surprisingly, 
considering that the phenomenon of group switching in the ep is well-known 
(see e. g., Brzinski, 1995 for an early discussion; and Corbett et al., 2005), lit-
tle comprehensive and systematic analysis of this phenomenon is currently 
available. In this section we discuss the methodology we have followed for 
the construction of our new, comprehensive dataset on group switching in the 
European Parliament, and present an account of its core features. In the next 
section we draw on the information provided by this new dataset to provide an 
account of the character and trends of group switching in the ep.
The dataset contains data on all 4163 individuals who have held a seat in 
the ep since the first direct ep elections in 1979 and until the end of the sixth 
legislature in June 2009. As a starting point, we have drawn information from 
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the Hix et al. dataset for the first five legislatures (Hix et al., 2006)2 and from 
Hoyland et al. (2009) for the sixth legislature.3 Although the Hoyland et al. data-
base encompasses all meps since 1979. we started from the Hix et al. dataset 
because it includes more accurate (though not fully updated) data on national 
party affiliation.4 The reason for this is that the online ep archive, from which 
the Hoyland et al. database derives its information, for a long while included 
only information on the latest available national party position. The ep archive 
was updated in early 2010 and now includes information on the party plat-
form on the basis of which an mep was elected into the ep at the start of each 
legislature. However, it does not mention changes of national party affiliation 
during legislatures.5 With the goal of enhancing the reliability of the dataset, 
we have cross-checked the data from both sources with information on the 
parliamentary curriculum of each mep in the updated ep archive, as well as 
with ep publications on the composition of political groups at the beginning 
and conclusion of each legislature. In case of doubt we consulted additional 
sources to verify, in particular, information on national party affiliation.
After compiling all the relevant information, the next step was to merge 
the data into a single data row for each mep per legislature. For example, if an 
mep switches between party groups within one legislature, this would lead to 
multiple entries in an output file from the Hoyland et al. database, in line with 
the way in which this is noted at the ep archive. The Hix et al. dataset contains 
only one ep party group affiliation (per mep per legislature) and we used the 
ep archive and the Hoyland et al. database as sources for information on group 
switching during the first five legislatures. Our dataset is structured in such a 
way that all relevant information on a single mep per legislature is contained in 
one data row. The whole dataset thus has 4163 data rows, for all meps per legis-
lature. Note that the total number of meps is significantly higher than the total 
seats in this period (3507) due to replacement of meps in the course of legisla-
tive mandates. The ep Group Switching Dataset includes a complete overview 
2 The dataset is available at http: / / personal.lse.ac.uk / hix / HixNouryRolandEPdata.htm.
3 The automated database is available at http: / / folk.uio.no / bjornkho / mep / default.htm.
4 For example, Enrico Ferri, an Italian mep, was elected into the ep in 1989 and 1994 on the 
list of the Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano, and – after a period in the Centro Cristiano 
Democratico between 1996 and 1999 – was elected in 1999 on the list of Forza Italia. In the 
Hoyland et al. database, Ferri is described as affiliated to Forza Italia in 1989 and in 1994 as well. 
In the Hix et al. dataset, Ferri is described as affiliated to the ccd in the fourth legislature (1994-
1999), which is also partly incorrect if one takes into consideration this was not the national 
party that got him elected into the ep. In our dataset and in the analysis developed here, we consi-
der only the national party platform on which each mep was elected to each given ep legislature.
5 The archive is available online at http: / / www.europarl.europa.eu / members / archive / .
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of all national parties and ep party groups, including a coding scheme.6 In the 
remainder of this section we discuss the coding of the different variables.
With regard to party group switching, we consider as a switch any change in 
ep party group affiliation that is not merely the consequence of a change in the 
name of a party group. As long as one group can be seen as the ‘natural succes-
sor’ of another, for example, when the Progressive Democrats were renamed 
as Group of the European Democratic Alliance, in 1988, we code both groups 
equally and do not consider a move from one group to the other a party group 
switch.7
We count as switch any move between party groups with different party 
group codes both in between legislatures (switches taking place at the start of 
a new legislature) and during a legislature. Including switches at the start of a 
legislature may be less intuitive, for those who are familiar with the interna-
tional literature on party switching, which normally focuses only on switches 
that occur during legislative terms. However, whereas in national legislatures 
the electoral platform and the parliamentary organization normally come 
together in the organization of a political party, in the ep these two dimen-
sions of political competition unfold separately, as we have seen above. meps 
are elected on the basis of a national party platform, and not on a European 
party group platform, but once they enter the ep, the strategic and ideological 
choice that has to be made with regard to the organization of their legisla-
tive activity relates primarily to the (European) party group, and not to the 
(national) party. Hence, national party delegations and meps confront the 
choice of party group affiliation at the start of each new legislature and strate-
gic group switches often occur here (see next section). In a significant number 
of cases meps switch both at the start of a term and also once, twice, or even 
three times during a term. We code all these switches separately including 
the timing of each switch ( measured by week into the legislature, thus rang-
ing from 0 to 60). We also code the group of departure and the new group 
for each switching occurrence. Furthermore, we code not only the ep party 
groups involved, but also the broader ideological party family to which each 
6 The dataset can be obtained on request. Please contact Ana Evans (ana.maria.evans@ics.
ul.pt).
7 Even when a name remains the same, this does not mean that there is no ideological 
 re-direction of a group. The Rainbow Group in 1989 retained its original name despite a funda-
mental ideological redirection due to the exit of the Greens. The regionalists and radicals who 
were left behind would join the new Green / European Free Alliance group in 1999. In the latter 
case our coding captures both the strategic choice of the Greens to exit the Rainbow Group and 
to start an independent Green party group in 1989 as well as the regionalists and radicals to join 
in 1999.
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group belongs, in order to capture if and how specific trends are associated 
with specific ideological groups.
For each switch we also code whether it involves an individual or a collec-
tive switch. We code switches as collective where at least two persons switch at 
the same time (in the same week) from one same party group to another same 
party group. Frequently, this means whole national party delegations switch-
ing from one ep group to another (as the Conservatives did in 1992 when they 
joined the European People’s Party). Sometimes collective switches involve a 
faction of a national party delegation. When two or three people make a move 
together from one same group and into another same group, we also code this 
as a collective switch. All other switches are coded as individual switches.
With regard to national party affiliation, and as mentioned above, we include 
information on the party platform on which a given mep has been elected for 
each given legislature where s / he holds a seat. We code national party switches 
that occur in-between legislatures by comparing national party affiliation at the 
re-election time. In other words, if an mep is elected to the ep for a second or 
subsequent time, but on the basis of a different national platform, we code this 
as a ‘national party switch’. We do not code national party switches during an 
ep legislative term due to lack of systematically available data.
As for ep leadership, we include information on what kind of positions 
were held by meps during a legislative term, including ep (vice-) President, 
Quaestor, Committee Chair, Delegation Chair, and President of a party group 
(=member of the Conference of Presidents). This information is available on 
the website of the ep, via the Archive. We have used the variable “Leadership” 
from the Hoyland et al. database to read this information from the website 
and have subsequently added this to our dataset. At this stage we have not yet 
included information on the allocation of rapporteurships, crucial positions 
within the political system of the ep (see e. g., Kaeding, 2004).
T R E N D S
When we look at the data on the evolution of group switching in the European 
Parliament between 1979 and 2009, at least two things are immediately strik-
ing. First, whereas group switching is largely acknowledged as a significant 
phenomenon, and has been estimated by some to range between 2% and 11% 
of members changing party group affiliation (Hoyland et al., 2009, p. 147), 
our data suggest that these estimates are conservative. Table 1 shows that a 
total of 377 out of all 4163 meps switched affiliation between 1979 and 2009, 
amounting to an average “switch rate” of around 9%. Nearly a third of those 
meps switched more than once, leading to a total of 519 switches (12.5% of 
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total meps). We see a clear peak of switch behavior in the 1989-1994 and 1994-
1999 legislatures. In the third legislature 108 meps, or nearly 18% of all meps, 
switched group affiliation at least once. Important episodes were the Greens 
splitting off from the regionalists and radicals and forming their own group, as 
well as the Conservatives joining the epp. In the fourth legislature, however, 
due to the fact that a large number of meps (46) switched two or more times, 
the total number of switches peaks at 149 (20.4% of total meps in that period). 
Whereas the number of meps switching (64) and the number of switches (99) 
decreased substantially in the fifth legislature, these numbers increased slightly 
in the sixth term (77 and 108, respectively).
When we look at the variation across member states, we first see signifi-
cant differences between countries and, second, two countries that stand out: 
France and Italy. These two countries account for more than half of all switches 
(283 out of 520). This should be related to the fragmentation of the French and 
Italian party systems, for example, when compared to the German party sys-
tem. Between those two, the Italian case stands out with the 592 Italian meps 
in the whole twenty-year period, switching party group affiliation 181 times 
(30.7%). We come back to this when discussing party switching at the national 
level (Table 6, below). For some of the new member states, especially Poland 
and Romania, party group switching is also very significant, while in other 
new member states such as Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia no meps had switched party group in the 
first legislature after accession.
TABLE 1
Number of group switches per legislature (1979-2009)
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EP
s
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0x 1x 2x 3x 4x
I 1979-1984 542 8 1 0 0 9 10 1.63 1.81 551 434
II 1984-1989 614 10 11 3 0 24 41 3.76 6.43 638 518
III 1989-1994 498 104 4 0 0 108 112 17.82 18.48 606 518
IV 1994-1999 636 49 39 6 1 95 149 13.00 20.38 731 626
V 1999-2004 633 36 22 5 1 64 99 9.18 14.20 697 626
VI 2004-2009 863 49 25 3 0 77 108 8.19 11.49 940 785
Total 3785 256 102 17 2 377 519 9.06 12.47 4163 3507
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TABLE 2
Number of group switches per member state (1979-2009)
Member
state
Number of MEPs per legislature 
who switch x times
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0x 1x 2x 3x 4x
AT 76 2 1 0 0 3 4 3.80 5.06 79 60
BE 164 8 6 0 0 14 20 7.87 11.24 178 146
BU 26 2 1 0 0 3 4 10.34 13.79 29 18
CY 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 6 6
CZ 24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 24 24
DK 95 9 4 1 0 14 20 12.84 18.35 109 94
ET 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 7 6
FI 64 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 64 46
FR 574 42 27 2 0 71 102 11.01 15.81 645 495
DE 571 12 0 0 0 12 12 2.06 2.06 583 540
GR 187 6 1 0 0 7 8 3.61 4.12 194 146
HU 26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 26 24
IT 479 61 38 12 2 113 181 19.09 30.74 592 495
IE 100 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.99 0.99 101 88
LA 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 10 9
LI 12 2 0 0 0 2 2 14.29 14.29 14 13
LU 49 1 0 0 0 1 1 2.00 2.00 50 36
MA 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 6 5
NL 176 4 2 1 0 7 11 3.83 6.01 183 164
PL 43 13 5 0 0 18 23 29.51 37.70 61 54
PT 141 13 1 0 0 14 15 9.03 9.68 155 122
RO 59 4 5 0 0 9 14 13.24 20.59 68 35
SK 14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 14 14
SN 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 8 7
ES 329 28 8 1 0 37 47 10.11 12.84 366 302
SW 81 1 0 0 0 1 1 1.22 1.22 82 63
UK 459 47 3 0 0 50 53 9.82 10.41 509 495
Total 3786 260 98 16 3 377 519 9.06 12.49 4163 3507
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Table 3 presents the information on collective versus individual switches, 
by party group. In line with the available literature, we find that in general 
collective switches clearly outweigh individual switches. However, our data 
also demonstrate that this partly depends on the party group context. For 
the party groups on the fringes of the ideological landscape the collective 
switches significantly outweigh the individual switches. For the party groups 
in the center this is much less the case, or even the opposite (as within the pes 
and epp).
Figure 1 shows the distribution of switching over the legislative term. What 
we see here is that around a quarter of all switches take place at the start of the 
legislature. These are generally meps who have been re-elected into the ep and 
switch party right at the start of the legislature. We also find some meps who 
switch twice or even three times within the first month (15 in the period under 
examination). Furthermore, we observe high switch activities in the third year 
TABLE 3
Collective versus individual switches per party group (total 1979-2009)
Party Group * Collective Individual Total
COM/EUL/NGL 30 4 34
LU 0 1 1
RBW/ERA 8 3 11
G/Greens/EFA 18 12 30
S/PES 4 17 21
L/LDR/ELDR/ALDE 21 13 34
EPP/EPP-ED 12 20 32
ED 43 2 45
FE 27 0 27
EPD/EDA/UFE/UEN 27 8 35
ER/DR 7 6 13
ITS 21 0 21
EN/I-EN/EDD/IND/DEM 34 11 45
TDI/CTDI 30 1 31
NA 110 29 139
 392 127 519
* Reference point is the party group from which an MEP switches.
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of each legislature, before but also after the important mid-term moment when 
leadership positions are re-allocated.
Looking closer into the direction of party group switching in the ep, 
Table 4 shows the overall movement between ideological groups between the 
start and the end of each legislature. The cells on the diagonal, highlighted in 
bold, represent those meps who stay within their ideological group or “party 
family” (we refer here to party families in order to highlight the broader stra-
tegic movement between ideological groups). First, when comparing row 
totals (start) and column totals (end) we see that in general there is a move-
ment toward the two largest ideological groups, the Socialists and the Chris-
tian Democrats. Second, we see that while the Socialists mainly profit from 
competition with the orthodox Left, the Christian Democrats receive mostly 
from the Conservatives and the populist Right. Third, it should be noted that 
the movement is not unidirectional, and we also see (smaller) groups of peo-
ple moving away from the ideological center.
In Table 5 we look at office incentives and focus on the leadership func-
tions that meps may hold in the ep, such as President or Vice-President of the 
ep, Quaestor, Committee Chair, or Delegation Chair. The results presented 
TABLE 4
EP Group Switches by Party Family (total 1979-2009)
Start legislature *
End legislature
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Left 254 1 25 1 0 0 0 0 8 289
Green/Regionalist 4 230 7 3 0 0 0 2 5 251
Socialist 5 6 1241 1 2 0 1 0 5 1261
Liberal 1 0 3 380 18 0 2 1 6 411
Christian-Democrat 0 0 0 14 1177 0 6 1 5 1203
Conservative 0 0 0 0 44 137 1 0 0 182
Right 0 0 1 3 27 0 227 1 15 274
Anti-EU 2 0 0 0 6 0 8 58 9 83
Other 5 8 6 9 7 0 16 10 148 209
Total 271 245 1283 411 1281 137 261 73 201 4163
* For MEPs who are re-elected the reference point is the last party group of the previous legislature.
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in Table 5 are ambiguous. The expected direction of the relationship between 
the two variables ep Leadership and Party Switch holds only to the extent that 
the percentage of group switching is lower for people with a leadership posi-
tion in one of the six legislatures (7.7%) than for those who have not held 
such a position (9.2%). However, the relationship between the two variables 
displayed in the crosstab is not statistically significant. Since there are relatively 
few leadership positions available within the ep, the effects of leadership may 
be expected to work more at a group level than at the individual level.
TABLE 5
EP party group switch by EP leadership
EP party group switch Total
No Yes No
EP Leadership
No
3476 351 3827
90.8% 9.2% 100.0%
Yes
310 26 336
92.3% 7.7% 100.0%
Total
3786 377 4163
90.9% 9.1% 100.0%
Pearson Chi-Square: .771;  Sig (2-sided): .380.
TABLE 6
EP Party Group switch and national party switch
EP party group switch Total
No Yes No
National
party switch
No
3734 352 4095
91.4% 8.6% 100.0%
Yes
43 25 68
63.2% 36.8% 100.0%
Total
3786 377 4163
90.9% 9.1% 100.0%
Pearson Chi-Square: 64.444, Sig (2-sided): .000
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A factor with more intuitive explanatory force is party switching at the 
national level. If meps have switched party affiliation at the national level there 
are good reasons to expect that this may have consequences for their party 
group affiliation at the ep level. Table 6 shows that, indeed, meps who have 
switched party at the national level, and are re-elected in the European Parlia-
ment, are more prone to switching than meps who have not switched at the 
national level. National party switching is an important phenomenon in coun-
tries with volatile party systems, such as France and Italy, and we see that 40 
out of the 69 meps who are re-elected into the ep on the basis of a new party 
list are from either France or Italy.
DI S C U S SION
It is a well-known fact among observers of party politics in the ep that electoral 
losses at the time of European elections contribute to the disappearance of 
parliamentary groups at the start of a new legislative mandate in the ep. This 
occurs when such electoral losses mean that the parties that held together in an 
ep parliamentary group fail to assemble sufficient seats to form an ep group at 
the start of a new ep legislature. On the other hand, the election of members 
from national parties previously not represented in the ep contributes to the 
formation of new coalitions – and therefore to the emergence of new ep par-
liamentary groups, often representing new sets of political interests. National 
party realignments during the campaigns for ep elections are also well-known 
factors for altering the choices for coalescing in the ep – hence, changing the 
composition of ep parliamentary groups at the start of a new legislature (see 
Corbett et al. 2005).Yet the literatures on legislative switching and on ep party 
politics offer little analysis of the phenomenon of group switching in the ep. 
Our research seeks to fill this gap.
The phenomenon of ep party group switching discussed in this paper high-
lights, to a greater extent than has been observed before, the fluidity that char-
acterizes the composition of European parliamentary groups. On average 9% of 
all meps switch during legislative terms. Party group switching is a  phenomenon 
that gained force especially in the legislatures during the 1990s, up to a maxi-
mum of 18% for the 1989-1994 term, with strong prevalence among representa-
tives from France and Italy, though by no means limited to those two countries. 
With regard to our expectations derived from the literature, we indeed see a 
clear tendency of party group switches from the  ideological extremes, both 
left and right, toward the center. We also observe that most switching takes 
place at the outset of legislative terms, with another peak around the half-term 
moment, when responsibilities rotate within the ep hierarchy.
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Second, when discussed in relation to the degree of consolidation of the 
European party system, this phenomenon also raises questions with regard 
to the quality of democratic representation in the eu. At a normative level, 
legislative switching is regarded as a reflection of instable party identity, 
which raises questions on all the essential dimensions of an operating demo-
cratic system, namely on the accountability of elected representatives, on the 
strength and performance of party representation, on the meaning of party 
labels to voters, on the reliability of policy-making coalitions – meaning stable 
government-opposition alignments that allow politicians to make reasonable 
calculations when negotiating legislative reform. The ep is hardly a nascent 
democratic institution: it has been operating for over 50 years, and its mem-
bers have been directly elected by the citizens of Member States for the past 
three decades. Yet its unique mix of electoral contests based on national party 
list, internal legislative organization, and political dynamics dominated by 
international party groups provides an institutional context that is not con-
ducive to party system stability. From that perspective, party group switching 
may be seen more as a natural element, than as an aberration of the political 
system of the ep.
In this paper we have provided a first comprehensive descriptive account 
of the phenomenon of party group switching in the ep. Explanatory work 
starts with a solid understanding of the nature of the phenomenon that needs 
to be explained and the extent to which it occurs. In that sense the evidence 
presented here complements existing studies that have focused more on ideo-
logical coherence of groups. These studies, albeit within limited time periods, 
emphasize the importance of ideological congruence between national party 
platforms and the policy positions of European parties (McElroy and Benoit 
2007, 2009). Our dataset is geared toward explaining group switching and 
can be expanded with additional information, for example on seniority of 
meps, voting behavior on roll call votes, or rapporteurships. Now that com-
prehensive data about elected representatives in the ep become increasingly 
accessible, the way is open to a better and more comprehensive understand-
ing of the phenomenon of party group switching. This paper takes a step in 
that direction.
 MEASURING GROUP SWITCHING IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (1979-2009) 111
BI BL IO G R A PH Y
attina, F. (1990), “The voting behaviour of the European Parliament members and the problem 
of Europarties”. European Journal of Political Research, 18 (5), pp. 557-579.
bardi, L. (1994), “Transnational party federations, European parliamentary groups, and the 
building of Euro-Parties”. In R. S. Katz and P. Mair (eds.), How Parties Organize: Adaptation 
and Change in Party Organizations in Western Democracies, London, Sage, pp. 357-372.
brzinski, J. B. (1995), “Political group cohesion in the European Parliament, 1989–1994”. 
In C. Rhodes and S. Mazey (eds.) The State of the European Union. Building a European 
Polity? London, Longman, pp. 135-158.
corbett, R., jacobs, F. and shackleton, M. (2005), The European Parliament, London, John 
 Harper Publishing.
desposato, S. (2006), “Parties for rent? Ambition, ideology and party switching in Brazil’s 
Chamber of Deputies”. American Journal of Political Science, 50 (1), pp. 62-80.
evans, A. M. (2009), “Bringing back a larger pie from Brussels: The adjustment of national party 
strategy through party switching in the European Parliament”. cies e-Working Paper, avai-
lable at http: / / www.cies.iscte.pt / destaques / documents / cies-wp62_Evans.pdf
faas, T. (2002), “Why do meps defect? An analysis of party group cohesion in the 5th Euro-
pean Parliament”. European Integration online Papers (eiop), 6 (2), available at http: / / eiop.
or.at / eiop / texte / 2002-002a.htm
faas, T. (2003), “To defect or not to defect? National, institutional and party group pressures 
on meps and their consequences for party group cohesion in the European Parliament”. 
European Journal of Political Research, 42 (6), pp. 841-866.
hall, P. A. and taylor, R. (1996), “Political Science and the three new institutionalisms”. Poli-
tical Studies, 44 (5), pp. 936-957.
heller, W. B. and mershon, C. (2005), “Party switching in the Italian Chamber of Deputies 
1996-2001”. The Journal of Politics, 67 (2), pp. 536-559.
heller, W. B. and mershon, C. (2009) Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching, London, 
Palgrave Macmillan.
hix, S. (2002), “Parliamentary behaviour with two principals: Preferences, parties and voting in 
the European Parliament”. American Journal of Political Science, 46 (3), pp. 688-698.
hix, S.(2005), The Political System of the European Union, London, Palgrave Macmillan.
hix, S., noury, A. and roland, G. (2006), “Dimensions of politics in the European Parliament”. 
American Journal of Political Science, 50 (2), pp. 494-511.
hix, S., noury, A. and roland, G. (2007), Democratic Politics in the European Parliament, 
 Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
hoyland, B., sircar, I. and hix, S. (2009) “An automated database of the European Parliament”. 
European Union Politics, 10 (1), pp. 143-152.
kaeding, M. (2004), “Rapporteurship allocation in the European Parliament: Information or 
distribution?”. European Union Politics 5 (3), pp. 353–378.
kreppel, A. (2002), The European Parliament and Supranational Party System: A Study in Insti-
tutional Development, New York, Cambridge University Press.
kreppel, A. (2004), “Moving in the other direction? The impact of domestic party system 
change on Italian meps”. Journal of European Public Policy, 11 (6), 975-999.
mainwaring, S. (1991), “Politicians, electoral systems, and parties: Brazil in comparative per-
spective”. Comparative Politics, 24 (1), pp. 21-43.
112 ANA MARIA EVANS AND MAARTEN PETER VINK
mainwaring, S. and scully, T. R. (eds.) (1995), Building Democratic Institutions in Latin 
 America, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
marsh, M. and norris, P. (1997) “Political representation in the European Parliament”. Euro-
pean Journal of Political Research, 32 (2), pp. 153-164.
maurer, A., parkes, R. and wagner, M. (2008), “Explaining group membership in the Euro-
pean Parliament: The British conservatives and the Movement for European Reform”. Jour-
nal of European Public Policy, 15 (2), pp. 246-262.
mcelroy, G. (2008), “Intra-Party politics at the trans-national level: Party switching in the Euro-
pean Parliament”. In D. Giannetti and K. Benoit (eds.), Intra-Party Politics and Coalition 
Governments in Parliamentary Democracies, London, Routledge, pp. 205-226.
mcelroy, G. and benoit, K. (2007), “Party groups and policy positions in the European Parlia-
ment”. Party Politics, 13 (1), pp. 5-28.
mcelroy, G. and benoit, K. (2009), “Party group switching in the European Parliament”. 
In W. Heller and C. Mershon (eds.) Political Parties and Legislative Party Switching, 
 Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 147–172.
mershon, C. and shvetsova, O. (2005) “Electoral cycles and party switching: Opportunistic 
partisan realignment in legislatures”. Paper prepared for Presentation at the 2005 Workshop 
of the Party Switching Research Group, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, July 10-14.
reif, K. and schmitt, H. (1980), “Nine second-order national elections: A conceptual frame-
work for the analysis of European election results”. European Journal of Political Research, 
8, pp. 3-44.
settembri, P. (2004), “When is a group not a political group? The dissolution of the tdi group 
in the European Parliament”. Journal of Legislative Studies, 10 (1), pp. 150-174.
shabad, G. and slomczynski, K. M. (2004), “Inter-Party mobility among Parliamentary candi-
dates in post-communist East Central Europe”. Party Politics, 10 (2), pp. 151-176.
strom, K. and muller, W. C. (1999), “Political parties and hard choices”. In W. C. Muller and 
K. Stroom, (eds.), Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make 
Hard Decisions, ny, Cambridge University Press.
verzichelli, L. (1999), “I gruppi parlamentari dopo il 1994. Fluiditá e riaggregazioni”. Rivista 
Italiana di Scienza Politica, 26 (2), pp. 391-413.
Received 05-06-2011. Accepted for publication 26-11-2011.
evans, A. M. and vink, M. P. (2012), “Measuring group switching in the European Parliament:
Methodology, data and trends (1979-2009)”. Análise Social, 202, xlvii (1.º), pp. 92-112.
